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Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in Product
Liability Actions: An Economic Comparison
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I. INTRODUCTION
The term "product liability" usually brings to mind per-
sonal injury. When products fail, however, either by reason of
design or manufacturing defects, buyers may suffer loss other
than personal injury. Whenever a product is used in a money-
making venture, the product's failure may lead to economic
loss to its owner. For example, assume a buyer purchases a
personal computer for use in a business, and the computer
breaks down, requiring three days for repair. The out-of-
pocket cost of repairing the computer is direct economic loss.
Any loss in profits resulting from the breakdown is conse-
quential economic loss. These damages, taken together and in
the absence of personal injury or property damage, constitute
pure economic loss. The total social cost of accidents caused by
product failure, therefore, includes both pure economic loss
and personal injury or property damage. Given that pure eco-
nomic losses exist, the next question is to decide who, between
buyer and seller, should bear the cost of those losses.
The Washington Supreme Court has recently considered
this question in the context of housing construction. The issue
in Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group1 was whether
the buyer or builder-seller of condominium units should bear
the cost of pure economic losses attributable to latent defects
in the manufacture of the condominiums. A homeowners asso-
ciation representing owners of the condominiums sued the
builder-seller. Among other theories, the suit alleged that the
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the guidance of Professor Thomas J.
Holdych, Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law, and Professor
Bruce Mann, Professor of Economics, University of Puget Sound.
1. 109 Wash. 2d 406, 745 P.2d 1284 (1987).
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builder-seller was liable for negligent construction to original
and subsequent purchasers. Damages claimed represented
only direct economic loss, that is, the cost of repair. In contrast
to the trial court, the supreme court refused to recognize a
cause of action for negligent construction under the facts
presented.2 The court drew a distinction between economic
loss caused by defects of quality such as interior deterioration,
which are appropriately governed by contract law, and per-
sonal injury or property damage caused by defects that cause
accidents involving violence or collision with external objects,
which are appropriately governed by tort law. In drawing this
distinction, the court analyzed the nature of the defect, the
type of risk, and the manner in which the injury arose. It held
that the loss in question was economic and, therefore, not
appropriately remedied by an action in tort for negligent con-
struction.4 Two dissenting justices rejected the distinction
drawn in the majority opinion between economic loss and per-
sonal injury or property damage, arguing that when negligence
causes a latent and dangerously defective condition, the buyer
should have an action for damages in tort even though the
buyer suffered only economic loss.
5
The Stuart decision is not inconsistent with the Tort
Reform Act of 19816 but is contrary to the court's prior deci-
sion in Berg v. General Motors Corp.7 Thus, the court allowed
lost profits to a commercial buyer when a product he
purchased to use in his business failed because of the manufac-
turer's negligence. The court in Stuart distinguished Berg on
the ground that the plaintiff claimed lost profits in addition to
cost of repair, whereas in Stuart only cost of repair was
claimed, and the only injury was to the product itself. In both
cases, however, the court was dealing with actions in tort in
which the plaintiffs were claiming pure economic loss. These
recent developments in the case law and statutes emphasize
the need to compare how well each of three major legal
2. Stuart, 109 Wash. 2d at 422, 745 P.2d at 1292.
3. According to the court, this distinction derives from the "safety-insurance
policy of tort law" and the "expectation-bargain protection policy of warranty law.
Id. at 421, 745 P.2d at 1293.
4. Id. at 420-22, 745 P.2d at 1291-92.
5. Id. at 425, 745 P.2d at 1294.
6. 1981 WASH. LAWS ch. 27.
7. 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976).
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rules-negligence, strict liability, and the Uniform Commercial
Code-allocate economic loss in terms of economic efficiency.
This Comment argues that in the allocation of pure eco-
nomic loss caused by product failure, the negligence rule is
generally more efficient than a strict liability rule and that a
contract rule is almost always more efficient than a negligence
rule. Part II presents a general discussion of the attributes of
an economically efficient remedy. In Part III, three legal rules
used to allocate pure economic loss are scrutinized under the
standards set forth in Part II.
II. ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFICIENT REMEDY
Before examining the attributes of an efficient8 remedy,
this Comment will briefly survey the economic explanations
for tort and contract rules. The tort system can be explained
in terms of two economic roles it plays in our society. One role
is deterrence: "to control the extent to which people engage in
activities which potentially impose costs on others."9 A second
role tort law plays is to allow victims, who are otherwise eligi-
ble, to recover damages that adequately reflect their losses.' °
Although the assignment of liability for damages may have no
influence on how resources are allocated if transaction costs
are zero,11
[t]he need for much of tort law arises from the existence
of transactions costs. Often such costs are so high that no
real (that is, negotiated) contract is possible at all, and yet
individuals, if they could overcome these barriers, would
make mutually advantageous bargains. Here the state comes
to the aid of these individuals. It writes into law the terms
they would have agreed to if they could have bargained.' 2
8. In the following discussion, the concept of "efficiency" is employed to describe
the use of resources in capacities in which their value is maximized. Value is
measured by the buyer's willingness to pay. W. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 8 (1979) [hereinafter HIRSCH]; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 9 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter POSNER].
9. R. BOWLES, LAW AND THE ECONOMY 107 (1982) [hereinafter BOWLES].
10. Id.
11. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960), cited in BOWLES,
supra note 9, at 109.
12. Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 241, 242 (1983) [hereinafter Bishop] (citing Demsetz, When Does the Rule
of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972)). Transaction costs include "the costs
of identifying the parties with whom one has to bargain, the costs of getting together
with them, the costs of the bargaining process itself, and the costs of enforcing any
19881
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Consequently, the adequacy of a tort rule in dealing with
an injury should be determined by comparing it to the hypo-
thetical rule to which the parties would have agreed if they
could have bargained.
In contract law, damage measures may act as a substitute
for complete contingent contracts. 13 In theory, parties to a con-
tract could bargain for every possible contingency. Damage
measures are needed, however, because the cost of bargaining
over every contingency is too high and because the occurrence
of some contingencies may be difficult or impossible to verify. 4
When a party contemplating breach is forced to take into
account the loss to the other party, "the payment of damages
for breach of contract tends to promote . .. efficient breach
behavior."' 5 Although there is no perfect damage measure, 6
commentators suggest that when both parties are risk-neu-
tral17 the expectation or benefit of the bargain measure per-
forms more efficiently than the reliance or out-of-pocket
measure.18
The traditional limitations on recovery of consequential
loss in contract also have an economic rationale. The mitiga-
tion doctrine protects against inefficient action by a nonbreach-
ing party that would aggravate the loss by encouraging the
redirection of resources formerly tied to the contract to other
uses.'9 The rule of consequential damages, which limits recov-
ery to loss of which the seller at the time of contracting had
bargain reached." A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (1983)
[hereinafter POLINSKY].
13. Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL. J. ECON. 466, 468
(1980) [hereinafter Shavell].
14. Id. at 468-69.
15. Id. at 472. The goal is "Pareto efficient breach behavior," in which parties will
breach as long as the breach makes someone better off without making someone else
correspondingly worse off. See POLINSKY, supra note 12, at 7 n.4.
16. Shavell, supra note 13, at 472 ("There does not exist a damage measure which
leads to Pareto efficient decisions concerning both breach and reliance independent of
the type of contractual situation; in other words, there is no damage measure which
acts as a perfect substitute for complete contingent contracts.").
17. "Risk neutral" means indifference between a risky opportunity and receiving
with certainty the expected value of that risk opportunity. Kornhauser, An
Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 683,
688 (1986) [hereinafter Kornhauser].
18. Id. at 710; Shavell, supra note 13, at 472.
19. Bishop, supra note 12, at 247, 251, 264. Professor Bishop terms the problem




reason to know, 20 comes from Hadley v. Baxendale,21 and
encourages efficient transfers of information.22 This contract
foreseeability rule
induces the party with knowledge of the risk either to take
appropriate precautions himself or, if he believes that the
other party might be the more efficient preventer or
spreader (insurer) of the loss, to reveal the risk to that party
and pay him to assume it. Incentives are thus created to
allocate the risk in the most efficient manner.23
Commentators are not in complete agreement that the
Hadley rule is better than other rules, but they do agree that
the foreseeability requirement is more efficient than a rule
allowing unforeseen damages.24  A rule allowing recovery of
unforeseen damages in contract is inefficient because it creates
adverse selection 25 problems. Buyers with higher than average
costs will not reveal those costs as potential losses when they
enter a contract, so sellers will act as though their potential
losses are lower than they actually are, thereby entering into
some contracts when they should not.26  "[O]ptimal decisions
will only be made if a decisionmaker must take into account
the full consequences of her decision. '27
With the economic explanations for tort and contract rules
in mind, we can now examine the attributes of an efficient
20. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 841 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-
715(2)(a) (1987).
21. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
22. Bishop, supra note 12, at 255.
23. POSNER, supra note 8, at 114 (footnote omitted). For determining the cheaper
insurer Posner suggests dividing the cost of insurance into two categories. First are
measurement costs, which consist of estimating the probability of the risk and the
expected magnitude. Second are the transaction costs, which include the cost of
pooling the risk with others to reduce or eliminate it. Id. at 93.
24. Compare Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 277, 296 (1972) ("[T]he rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is economically
correct in its reliance upon notice and information. Such notice is the only way that
economic optima can be achieved, since the negotiation itself cannot serve as a
mechanism for transmitting information with respect to the magnitude of the risk to
be transferred.") with Perloff, Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 61-62 (1981) (when both parties are risk
neutral, several rules lead to an efficient outcome) and Kornhauser, supra note 17, at
719.
25. "Adverse selection" means that, because the price of insurancd is based on the
average risk of insurance buyers, high risk buyers are more likely to buy insurance.
Bishop, supra note 12, at 246.
26. Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 719.
27. Id.
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remedy. Economists view an efficient legal rule as one that
induces people to behave in such a way that no one can be
made better off without making someone else worse off.
28
Such a rule is Pareto efficient. Pareto efficient remedies real-
locate resources to reflect the resource allocations that would
exist if people behaved in an efficient manner. Therefore,
when evaluating any legal remedy, one should ask: "Will
imposing liability create incentives for value-maximizing con-
duct in the future?"
29
An efficient legal remedy has three components. First, it
will create incentives for the relevant individuals or firms to
behave efficiently. Behavioral incentives include both incen-
tives to take the proper amount of care and incentives to
engage in the proper level of activity.30 Second, an efficient
legal remedy will efficiently allocate risk among the firms and
individuals. 1 Efficiently allocating risk means placing the risk
on the least risk averse person 32 or according to the parties'
relative aversion to risk. For simplicity, we will assume that
all parties are risk neutral, so efficient risk allocation will not
play an important role in the following discussion. Neverthe-
less, the effect of efficient risk allocation should be borne in
mind when the risk preferences of parties to a transaction are
known. Third, an efficient legal remedy will minimize litiga-
tion and administrative costs.
Whether one remedy is more efficient than another will
be affected by asymmetric information and positive costs to
transfer that information. An efficient rule creates incentives
to transfer information when transfer costs, such as the cost
for the parties to meet and negotiate, are low. When the costs
of meeting and negotiating are high, tort rules such as negli-
gence and strict liability should operate as substitutes for the
bargaining process. Finally, under strict liability, insurance
problems such as moral hazard33 and adverse selection
34 will
play a role in evaluating efficiency. The following section
presents three legal rules under which pure economic loss may
28. See id. at 688-89.
29. POSNER, supra note 8, at 85.
30. POLINSKY, supra note 12, at 15-21.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 119.
33. "Moral hazard" means the fact of having insurance creates incentives for an
insured to be less careful. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 150.
34. See supra note 25.
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be recoverable and evaluates these rules under the foregoing
economic principles.
III. LEGAL RULES ALLOCATING PURE ECONOMIC Loss
In 1981, the Washington Legislature resolved the question
of whether pure economic loss is recoverable in tort or con-
tract. The resolution was bold and simple. The Tort Reform
Act of 1981 defines a product liability claim to include any
claim brought for harm caused by the manufacture of a prod-
uct, including any claim previously based on strict liability in
tort, negligence, and breach of express or implied warranty.35
The Act then defines "harm" to include "any damage recog-
nized by the courts of this state: Provided, That the term
'harm' does not include direct or consequential economic loss
under Title 62A RCW."36 Finally, in defining the scope of its
provisions, the Act provides that "nothing in this chapter shall
prevent the recovery of direct or consequential economic loss
under Title 62A RCW. ' 37
The effect of the Act is not as broad as it appears on first
reading. For example, the Act does not exclude all conse-
quential economic loss. The Journal of the Senate makes clear
that "[o]ther types of economic harm, such as wage loss, are
included in the term harm .... ,,38 Thus, if a defectively manu-
factured computer caught fire and burned the purchaser, the
purchaser could recover for past lost wages and, presumably,
lost future earnings. By analogy, if a defectively manufactured
computer caught fire and burned the purchaser's place of busi-
ness, it follows that he should recover lost profits and injury to
goodwill. The Act appears to draw a distinction, however,
between direct or consequential economic loss with injury to
persons or property, and direct or consequential economic loss
without injury. This analysis is consistent with the result
reached by the majority in Stuart39 and with the comment of
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(4) (1987).
36. Id. § 7.72.010(6).
37. Id. § 7.72.020(2).
38. SENATE JOURNAL, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. 630 (1981).
39. 109 Wash. 2d at 420, 745 P.2d at 1291. The reasoning in the case, however, casts
a shadow of confusion over how the definition of "harm" in the Act ought to be
construed. In drawing the distinction between economic loss (recoverable only in
contract) and physical damage (recoverable in tort), the court emphasized that "the
determinative factor should not be the items for which damages are sought, such as
repair costs." Id. Instead, the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in
which the injury arose are determinative. In contrast, the Act appears to rely on the
1988]
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one legislator that the Act "is confined to physical harm to per-
sons and property and leaves economic loss, standing alone, to
the U.C.C.
' 40
Nevertheless, the Act has significant impact on Washing-
ton law. It essentially overrules Berg and adopts the position
that a buyer's disappointed expectations are protected by the
Uniform Commercial Code, and that the law of product liabil-
ity does not afford a remedy for pure economic loss. 41 Accord-
ingly, when a buyer buys a defectively manufactured computer
that fails to perform as he expected and causes injury to the
buyer's business, the buyer cannot recover in either negligence
or strict liability for the cost of repair, lost profits, or damages
for injury to goodwill. The buyer must seek his remedy under
the Uniform Commercial Code. As one legislator observed,
"[t]he parties could appropriately contract in the commercial
setting on those issues. "42 The following section first analyzes
the two tort rules rejected by the Tort Reform Act of 1981. It
then analyzes the remedies provided by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code as the preferred remedies in Washington for compen-
sating pure economic loss.
A. Tort
The law of torts adjusts the losses arising from human
activities and affords compensation for injuries sustained by
one person caused by the conduct of another. 3 Damages
awarded are of three general types: compensatory, nominal,
and punitive." We will discuss only compensatory damages.
When a person suffers only economic harm, compensatory
damages are intended to place him in a position substantially
equivalent to that which he would have occupied had there
been no tort committed.45  This rule maintains the earlier
income distribution of the parties.46
definitions of direct and consequential loss found in WASH. REV. CODE § § 62A.2-714 (2)
& -715(2) (1987). Until the court directly faces this issue under the Act, the meaning
of "harm" may be unclear.
40. Talmadge, Tort and Product Liability Reform, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 10
(1981) [hereinafter Talmadge].
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id.
43. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (5th ed. 1984).
44. Punitive damages are not recoverable in tort under Washington law.
Kammerer v. Western Gear, 96 Wash. 2d 416, 635 P.2d 708 (1981).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 comment a (1977).
46. HIRSH, supra note 8, at 153.
[Vol. 11:283
Pure Economic Loss
Damages recoverable in tort are subject to the limitations
of certainty, mitigation, and foreseeability or proximate cause.
The limitations of certainty of proof and the duty to mitigate
are similar in tort and contract, but the foreseeability limita-
tion differs. Unlike contract damages, tort damages are not
limited to those that the. tortfeasor had reason to know when
the tort occurred..Although it is necessary to establish that the
tortfeasor's conduct poses a foreseeable risk to the victim, it is
not necessary that the tortfeasor foresee the particular harm
that occurred. If the victim was in the foreseeable scope of
danger posed by the tortfeasor's conduct, the tortfeasor may be
liable for all harm for which his conduct was a substantial fac-
tor in bringing to pass.4" Tort law provides two remedial
schemes, subject to the foregoing limitations, applicable when
a victim suffers pure economic loss: negligence and strict
liability.
1. Negligence
In order for a party to recover in negligence he must show
that 1) the defendant owed him a duty of care; 2) the defend-
ant breached that duty of care; and 3) the defendant's breach
resulted in damage to the other party.
The common law has incorporated a form of cost-benefit
analysis to determine whether a defendant has breached the
duty of care. According to Judge Learned Hand,4" an injurer is
negligent if B < PL, where B is the cost of taking precautions
to avoid the loss, P is the probability that the accident will
occur, and L is the magnitude of the loss if the accident actu-
ally occurs. PL can be described as the expected accident cost.
When B > PL, an injurer should not be held liable in negli-
gence because the additional benefit (in terms of accident pre-
vention) from taking more care is less than the cost of taking
the additional care. The Learned Hand formula is illustrated
in Figure L" The PL curve shows the marginal change in
expected accident costs as more care is used; the B curve shows
the marginal costs of care."° The intersection of the B and PL
curves at c* represents due care. Application of these princi-
47. Fleming v. Seattle, 45 Wash. 2d 477, 275 P.2d 904 (1954).
48. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173, reh'g denied, 160 F.2d
482 (2d Cir. 1947).
49. POSNER, supra note 8, at 149.
50. Id. The PL curve has a negative slope on the assumption that additional units
of care will be gradually less effective in preventing accidents. The B curve has a
1988]
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Figure 1. Learned Hand's Negligence Formula
ples to cases involving pure economic loss has led to a split in
authority, exemplified by the following discussion of two cases
allocating pure economic loss representing lost profits caused
by the failure of engines on commercial seagoing vessels.
A majority of courts reject claims in negligence for eco-
nomic loss when the only physical injury alleged is to the prod-
uct itself.51  The United States Supreme Court recently
adopted the majority view with respect to admiralty actions in
East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.52 In
that case, a shipbuilder contracted with Transamerica Delaval
to design, manufacture, and supervise the installation of tur-
bines to power four supertankers. The shipbuilder then gave
East River Steamship a charter on one of the finished vessels.
positive slope on the assumption that inputs of care are scarce and cost more as they
are purchased by manufacturers.
51. See, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S.
858 (1986); Noel Transfer & Package Delivery Service, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
341 F. Supp. 968 (D. Minn. 1972); Stuart v. Coldwell Banker, 109 Wash. 2d 406, 745 P.2d
1284 (1987). See also Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Arizona Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz.
444, 666 P.2d 544 (1983); Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1972); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 293, 217 S.E.2d 602
(1975); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Alfred N.
Koplin & Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977);
Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981); National Crane
Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Trans World Airlines
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955); Inglis v.
American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
52. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
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The vessel developed turbine damage. East River Steamship
sued Transamerica Delaval in negligence and strict liability,
seeking damages for cost of repair and lost income.
The Court presented three reasons for rejecting East River
Steamship's claim. First, consequential economic loss caused
by the failure of a product is more insurable by buyers than
loss caused by personal injury; therefore, the increased cost of
the product would not be justified.53 Second, parties should be
free to allocate risks among themselves without the intrusion
of tort liability.54 Third, warranty law contains an adequate
remedy with necessary limitations on liability, that is, privity
and remoteness, while liability in tort could subject manufac-
turers to damages in an indefinite amount.
A few courts have adopted the opposite view, that conse-
quential economic loss is recoverable in negligence even when
the only physical injury alleged was to the product itself.56 In
Berg v. General Motors Corp.,57 a pre-tort reform case, the
Washington Supreme Court allowed recovery of consequential
economic loss in negligence. In that case, Berg, a commercial
fisherman, purchased a General Motor's marine engine from a
dealer. The dealer installed the engine in Berg's commercial
fishing vessel. The engine broke down during the fishing sea-
son. Berg sued the dealer and General Motors in negligence,
seeking damages based on the anticipated value of the fish that
he would have caught had the vessel not been laid up in
repairs.
The court gave four reasons for its decision to allow recov-
ery. First, recovery in negligence would not increase a manu-
facturer's exposure to lawsuits because the manufacturer
would be liable in warranty in any event.58 Second, the distinc-
tion between products that destroy themselves and cause con-
sequential economic loss (consequential damages not
recoverable in negligence), and products that destroy them-
selves as well as other property and cause consequential eco-
53. Id. at 871-72.
54. Id. at 873.
55. Id. at 872-75.
56. See, e.g., Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976).
See also State ex rel. Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215
(1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557
S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977); W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah
1976).
57. 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976).
58. Id. at 591-92, 555 P.2d at 822.
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nomic loss (consequential damages recoverable in negligence)
is unsound.59 Third, when a manufacturer foresees that its
product will eventually be purchased by someone using the
product commercially, the manufacturer owes the purchaser a
duty not to impair the purchaser's business with a faulty prod-
uct.6" Fourth, there is no substantive basis in the law of negli-
gence for denying a purchaser lost profits in a suit against a
remote manufacturer.6
Thus, East River Steamship and Berg illustrate the two
views on the recovery of pure economic loss in negligence
when the only physical injury alleged is to the product itself.
Each court reaches its conclusion by rejecting the assumptions
of the other concerning the ability of the manufacturer to esti-
mate the risk of consequential economic loss, the extent of
exposure that liability in tort creates, and the desirability of
charging the manufacturer with liability in tort for the satis-
factory performance of its products in a purchaser's business.
The divergent views expressed in these two cases raise the
question of which view is most consistent with the hypothetical
efficient remedy to which the tortfeasor and victim would have
agreed.
To allow a buyer to recover pure economic loss in negli-
gence means a manufacturer will only be liable if he exercises
less care than is cost-effective. If the manufacturer is liable
only for losses connected with personal injury or property
damage (including lost earnings), his expected accident cost,
PL, will be lower than if he is also liable for pure economic
losses. Consequently, the manufacturer's level of care will not
reflect the likelihood of his product's failure causing pure eco-
nomic loss. The resulting failure of the manufacturer to take
reasonable care to prevent pure economic loss results in an
inefficient allocation of resources because the buyer will have
to exercise additional care that could be exercised more
cheaply by the manufacturer.
If the expected accident cost is higher because it includes
pure economic loss, a negligence rule will cause the manufac-
turer to spend more to prevent accidents. Using the Hand dia-
gram in Figure 2, PL will shift upward because L, the amount
of loss, is higher. Although expected accident costs (PL)
59. Id. at 592, 555 P.2d at 822.
60. Id. at 592-93, 555 P.2d at 822-23.
61. Id. at 593, 555 P.2d at 823.
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increase, the marginal cost of prevention, the B curve, does
not. The B curve will shift upward only when the technology
of caretaking, or when the price of inputs for caretaking,
becomes more expensive. The new optimal level of care will be
C2, the intersection of B and PL 2. It follows that when PL
includes the probability and magnitude of pure economic loss
and personal injury, the manufacturer will exercise an effi-
cient level of care.
If the manufacturer is using an efficient level of care, the
buyer will bear the risk of pure economic loss that arises from
product failure despite manufacturer care. Therefore, the
buyer will be induced to exercise an efficient level of care to
protect from losses not covered by the manufacturer's exercise
of care. If the buyer exercised more than the efficient or cost-
effective level of care, his costs for the additional care would
exceed the cost of the accidents that the additional care would
prevent. If the buyer exercised less than the efficient or cost-
effective level of care, his costs for repairs would exceed the
cost of care that would prevent the accidents. Whether the
buyer will use more care when pure economic losses can be
recovered in negligence than when only personal injury and
related losses can be recovered in negligence depends, how-
ever, on whether the buyer has an available remedy for those
same losses in contract.
The level of care exercised by manufacturers affects their
1988]
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marginal costs 6 2 and, therefore, their level of output. If PL
includes the probability and magnitude of pure economic loss,
then as a result of the manufacturer's higher costs (in terms of
optimal accident deterrence), the manufacturer's marginal
costs will be higher than if recovery of pure economic loss is
not allowed. The industry supply curve will shift inwards
because each additional unit of output will be more expensive
to produce, leading to a decrease in output of the product.
Because price at the lower level of output will be higher, the
quantity demanded will decrease. However, market demand
may increase if the manufacturer's liability matches the value
of the contract to the buyer. Thus, the overall level of the
manufacturer's activity with respect to output may change
either in the positive or negative direction. Without recovery
of pure economic loss, the risk of loss would be on the buyer,
who in a world of perfect information would take the risk into
account as part of the true cost of the product and demand the
efficient amount of the product. Interestingly, in terms of sup-
ply and demand, allowance and disallowance of recovery for
pure economic loss leads to the same result. The reason for
this result is probably that the law of negligence, including the
rule of comparative fault, imposes reciprocal duties of reason-
able care on the buyer and seller.
The level of care a buyer exercises will affect his intensity
of use of the product. A buyer's ability to use a product with
more or less intensity will affect his utility of, and therefore,
his demand for, the product. As shown in Figure 3, demand
will be greatest if the legal rule allows the buyer to use the
product with high-intensity, compared to moderate or low-
intensity. Under a legal rule allowing a buyer to recover pure
economic loss from a manufacturer, the buyer would receive
added utility from a higher use, and the demand curve will
shift upward. In negligence, the buyer would not be likely to
make maximum use of the product, however, because his com-
parative fault may reduce his recovery. A buyer who keeps his
computer running 24 hours a day is more likely to be found
partially at fault for causing a loss due to product failure than
someone who used the same computer only during business
hours. Therefore, a negligence rule probably results in a mar-
ket demand for moderate use, represented by Dmod in Figure 3,
62. Marginal cost is the change in total costs caused by a one-unit change in
output. POSNER, supra note 8, at 8.
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and creates incentives for buyers to use the product at a cost-
effective activity level.
Thus, given care and activity level incentives, if PL can be
accurately determined, negligence is an efficient way to com-
pensate a buyer for pure economic loss. However, for conse-
quential losses in general, manufacturers often cannot
accurately determine PL, or if they can, the information costs
are high. The buyer has a much better idea of how great his
economic losses are likely to be. Transferring this information
is costly. This asymmetric information problem may cause the
manufacturer to take more or less care than he would need to
take if he could accurately estimate the buyer's economic loss
in the event of product failure, which will lead to a misalloca-
tion of resources. To the extent that the manufacturer cannot
cheaply and accurately estimate the appropriate level of care,
he has an incentive to seek insurance or a waiver of negligence
liability. Consequently, if the buyer can self-insure, allowing
recovery of consequential economic loss from the manufac-
turer is not Pareto efficient.
2. Strict Liability
Strict liability means a tortfeasor is liable for the victim's
1988]
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damages even if, in Learned Hand's terms, B < PL.63 Unlike a
negligence rule, strict liability reduces accident costs by induc-
ing changes in the activity level, as illustrated by Figure 4.64
MCP is the industry's private marginal cost curve. MC, is the
industry's social marginal cost curve because it includes the
cost of accidents. Under strict liability, the industry will per-
ceive its cost curve as MC, and reduce output from q, to q*.
This reduction in output eliminates the social accident costs,
represented by the shaded area. When changes in activity
levels by potential injurers are the most efficient way to pre-
vent accidents, strict liability is appropriate.
65
As was the case in negligence, the majority of courts
refuse to award consequential economic loss in strict liability
when the only physical injury alleged is to the product itself.66
The commentators are generally in accord with the majority
view.67 The case most often cited in support of this view is
63. Id. at 160.
64. Id. at 162.
65. Id. at 163.
66. For an excellent discussion of the position taken by the majority of American
courts, see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280
(3d Cir. 1980). See also Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir.
1982); Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976)
(Pennsylvania law); Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d (5th Cir.
1973) (Texas law); Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d
1013 (9th Cir.) (Arizona law), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970); Arizona v. Cook Paint &
Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp. 962 (D.Ariz. 1975) (under laws of Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Texas, and Alaska), affd, 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
915 (1977); Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Indus., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa 1975);
Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa
1973); Cooley v. Salopian Indus., Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974) (South Carolina
law); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Arrow Leasing
Corp. v. Cummins Ariz. Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz. 444, 666 P.2d 544 (1983); Beauchamp v.
Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 P.2d 41 (1973); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403
P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d
983 (1975); Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 141 Ga. App. 671, 234 S.E.2d 123 (1977); Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Cline v. Prowler
Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980); Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American
Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Mathews Co.,
190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973); Cayuga Harvester v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95
A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1983); Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, Inc., 350 N.W.2d 591
(N.D. 1984); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Industrial Uniform Rental
Co. v. International Harvester Co., 317 Pa. Super. 65, 463 A.2d 1085 (1983); Nobility
Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977); Star Furniture Co. v.
Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
67. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 418 (2d ed. 1980); Franklin, When Worlds Collide.
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974,
989-90 (1966); Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L.
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Figure 4. Effect on Industry Output of Strict Liability
Seely v. White Motor Co. 8  Seely, through a dealer, bought a
truck manufactured by White Motor Co. He bought the truck
for use in his business of heavy-duty hauling. The truck had
numerous mechanical problems, some of which caused an acci-
dent that damaged the truck. Seely sued the dealer and White
Motor Co. in strict liability for money paid on the purchase
price, cost of repairs, and lost profits in his business. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that Seely could not recover conse-
quential economic loss in strict liability and must look to the
law of warranty for his remedy. The court explained the dis-
tinction between tort recovery for physical injuries and war-
ranty recovery for economic loss as follows:
The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the
nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake
in distributing his products. He can appropriately be held
liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his
goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of con-
REV. 309, 316-18, 327 (1973); Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury
and Article 2 of the UC.C, 48 Mo. L. REV. 1, 26 n.87 (1983); Comment, The Vexing
Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a
Remedy, 4 SETON HALL 145, 175 (1972); Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability
Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 961, 965 (1966); Note, Manufacturers' Liability
to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 539, 548-49 (1966). Cf. Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines:
Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19
RUTGERS L. REV. 692, 712 (1965), cited in Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 98
N.J. 555, 575, 489 A.2d 660, 670 (1985).
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ditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be
held liable for the level of performance of his products in
the buyer's business unless he agrees that the product was
designed to meet the buyer's demands.6 9
The court stated that if a manufacturer could be held lia-
ble for the performance of its product in the business of a pur-
chaser with whom it has not dealt, the manufacturer would be
liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope.7 0 The
court noted that the risk of personal injury was more insurable
by the manufacturer than was the risk of economic loss to the
purchaser's business.7 1 Finally, the court emphasized the abil-
ity of the parties to allocate the risk of consequential economic
loss by agreement.7 2
A minority of jurisdictions has allowed recovery in strict
liability for pure economic loss. 73 The case most frequently
cited for this view is Santor v. A. and M. Karagheusian.7 4 In
that case, a dealer sold Santor a home carpet manufactured by
Karaghesian. The carpet arrived with flaws in it. When
Santor attempted to contact the dealer, he found that the
dealer was out of business. Santor sued Karagheusian under
an implied warranty theory for direct economic loss represent-
ing the diminished value of the carpet. The court allowed
recovery, stating in dictum that recovery under the doctrine of
strict liability would also be appropriate.7 5 Further, the court
noted:
As we indicated in Henningsen, the great mass of the
purchasing public has neither adequate knowledge nor suffi-
cient opportunity to determine if articles bought or used are
defective. Obviously, they must rely upon the skill, care and
reputation of the maker. It must be said, therefore, that
when the manufacturer presents his goods to the public for
69. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
70. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
71. Id. at 18-19, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio
1979); Berkely Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983)
(Arkansas product liability statute); Verdon v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 187 Conn. 363,
446 A.2d 3 (1982) (Connecticut product liability statute); Cova v. Harley Davidson
Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970); Santor v. A. and M.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); City of La Crosse v. Schubert,
Schroeder & Associates, Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
74. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
75. Id. at 63-67, 207 A.2d at 311-13.
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sale he accompanies them with a representation that they
are suitable and safe for their intended use.7"
Although Santor dealt only with direct economic loss, it
has served as the basis for extending strict liability to cases
including consequential economic loss.7 Nevertheless, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has recently limited the scope of
the Santor ruling. In Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co.,78 the court held that a commercial buyer seeking
damages for only direct and consequential economic loss can-
not recover in either negligence or strict liability.7 9 Commer-
cial buyers are limited to the protection of the Uniform
Commercial Code. The court explained:
Generally speaking, tort principles, such as negligence,
are better suited for resolving claims involving unanticipated
physical injury, particularly those arising out of an accident.
Contract principles, on the other hand, are generally more
appropriate for determining claims for consequential damage
that the parties have, or could have, addressed in their
agreement.8 0
In sum, there are two positions on recovery of pure eco-
nomic loss in strict liability. The majority denies recovery on
the theory that the loss is more appropriately addressed under
the Uniform Commercial Code. A minority allows recovery,
arguing that there is no basis for distinction between loss
accompanied by personal injury or property damage other than
damage to the product and loss as a result of a defective prod-
uct unaccompanied by personal injury or property damage. A
variation of the minority rule allows recovery of pure eco-
nomic loss in strict liability only to non-commercial buyers.
This split in authority again raises the question of which rule is
most consistent with the hypothetical efficient remedy to
which the tortfeasor and victim would have agreed.
If recovery for pure economic loss is allowed in strict prod-
ucts liability, the manufacturer becomes a market insurer for
losses caused by defective manufacture or design. The manu-
facturer will exercise a cost-effective level of care and buy
insurance for losses that cannot be prevented by cost-effective
76. Id. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311 (citations omitted).
77. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
78. 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
79. Id. at 578, 489 A.2d at 672.
80. Id.
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measures. If the manufacturer were to spend more on accident
prevention than the benefit derived from those expenditures,
he would be acting irrationally. He will take precautions only
to the point where B = PL, in Hand's terms. The buyer's level
of care depends on whether the rule takes into account the
buyer's fault. If comparative fault is not considered, then the
buyer can recover for all his injuries without assuming the
costs associated with taking care. The rule creates no incen-
tives for the buyer to exercise due care. Therefore, if compara-
tive fault is not taken into account in awarding damages under
a strict liability rule, the buyer will fail to exercise an efficient
level of care. However, if comparative fault is considered, the
buyer will take a cost-effective amount of care just as under a
negligence rule."1 Thus, strict liability recovery for pure eco-
nomic loss creates incentives for efficient buyer behavior in
terms of exercising care only when the buyer's comparative
fault operates as a check on his award of damages.
In comparison to a negligence rule, the level of the manu-
facturer's activity or production under strict liability for pure
economic losses will decrease because of the added cost of full
insurance for losses that cannot be prevented by the exercise
of reasonable care. When the buyer is the cheaper insurer,
increased costs will force the manufacturer to supply less than
the efficient amount of products at any given price. When the
manufacturer is the cheaper insurer, however, equilibrium
price and quantity will be the same as under a negligence rule
because the manufacturer would prefer to offer the insurance
himself to increase quantity demanded.
The buyer's activity level, in terms of intensity of use, is
likely to be higher under a strict liability rule in jurisdictions
that do not consider the buyer's comparative fault than under
a negligence rule. Forcing the manufacturer to bear the full
cost of insurance gives buyers incentives to exercise a higher
level of use in order to gain the added utility high use offers.
Market demand will increase as shown in Figure 5 from Dmod
to Dhigh. The shift in demand will be particularly great among
high-intensity users such as commercial buyers. The attraction
of high-intensity users to the market creates adverse selection
problems because the manufacturer is likely to estimate its
costs based on the intensity of use of the average buyer. On
the other hand, low-intensity users may select alternatives to
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Figure 5. Effect of Strict Liability on Consumer Demand
avoid subsidizing high-intensity users, thereby limiting the
upward shift in the demand curve. At the same time, as men-
tioned before, the industry supply curve will shift upward from
S 1 to S 2, if strict liability, rather than negligence, is the legal
rule for recovery of pure economic loss. As a result, the equi-
librium price will increase. Equilibrium output may be smaller
or greater, depending on the magnitude of the shifts and the
slopes of the curves. In any event, the added utility of greater
intensity of use enjoyed by the buyer will come at the expense
of the manufacturer.
With regard to the standard of minimizing litigation and
administrative costs, strict liability in tort appears to perform
no better or no worse than a negligence rule. Although a strict
liability case may be cheaper to prove than a negligence case,
this cost saving may be offset by a resulting larger number of
strict liability claims, which create higher administrative
costs.8 2 Both rules require judicial determination of liability
and damages.
Either the manufacturer or the buyer can self-insure to
cover losses caused by defective products. The strict liability
rule for allocation of pure economic loss, however, forces the
82. Id. at 164.
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manufacturer to provide market insurance. A strict liability
rule will be efficient only if market insurance is cheaper than
self-insurance. This is unlikely for several reasons. Potential
economic losses are widely disparate across the universe of
buyers, and buyers have better information about the likeli-
hood and magnitude of their consequential loss. In addition to
the asymmetric information problems, market insurance suf-
fers from the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.
High-intensity users, such as commercial buyers, will have a
higher level of demand for the product because of the low cost
of market insurance compared to self-insurance. All users will
exercise less care than they would exercise if they were self-
insured and had to pay a deductible before recovering. Self-
insurance by buyers avoids adverse selection problems because
the insurer can tailor the policy to the insured's particular
needs.8 3 Also, self-insurance avoids moral hazard problems by
requiring that the insured pay a deductible before recovering
under the policy.
In sum, allowing recovery for pure economic loss in strict
liability is less satisfactory than restricting such recovery to
negligence. Asymmetric information, adverse selection, and
moral hazard combine to make strict liability an inefficient
remedy relative to negligence. If the buyer is forced to self-
insure because he cannot recover from the manufacturer, the
price reduction to the buyer will be greater than the cost of
market insurance. Strict liability poorly approximates the
hypothetical remedy to which the parties would have agreed.
Consequently, manufacturers would prefer to disclaim
strict liability for consequential economic losses and buyers
would prefer to self-insure for such losses. When buyers and
sellers can agree to waive strict liability, an efficient result can
be achieved. However, to the extent transaction costs exceed
the cost of having sellers bear the risk of consequential eco-
nomic loss, buyers will not bargain for waivers and will be
trapped by an inefficient rule. Such a result is likely to occur
with the small businessman or one-time purchaser, who enters
into fewer transactions on a less frequent basis than very large
businesses, or buyers who buy in large volumes. In commercial
transactions, the parties have better information and can estab-
lish contract terms more efficiently than parties to commercial




transactions. Nevertheless, the marginal buyer can be expected
to demand disclaimers of strict liability when buyers can self-
insure more cheaply than the manufacturer can provide mar-
ket insurance.
B. The Uniform Commercial Code
The general measure of damages for breach of warranty
under the Code is the buyer's expectation interest, defined as
"the difference at the time and place of acceptance between
the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have
had if they had been as warranted. 'S4 This measure of dam-
ages is analogous to direct economic loss. The Code also allows
consequential damages, defined to include "any loss resulting
from general or particular requirements of which the seller at
the time of contracting had reason to know . . . and injury to
person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty."8
5
The Code, like tort law, imposes three limitations on the
injured party's ability to recover damages for consequential
loss. First, the injured party cannot recover damages for loss
that he could have avoided if he had taken appropriate steps to
do so.8 6 Second, the injured party cannot recover damages for
loss beyond the amount that he proves with reasonable cer-
tainty.87 Third, the injured party can recover only for loss
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to
know. 8 This foreseeability rule differs from the broader rule
followed in tort, which allows recovery for consequential losses
even though the tortfeasor did not foresee the particular type
of harm he caused.8 9
Product liability under the Uniform Commercial Code is
founded upon breach of warranty. The Uniform Commercial
Code recognizes both express and implied warranties. Express
warranties are created when the seller makes an affirmation of
fact or promise that relates to the goods, describes the goods,
or offers a sample or model that becomes part of the basis of
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-714(2) (1987); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.1-
106(1) (1987) ("aggreived party may be put in as good a position as if the other party
had fully performed .... ").
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-715(2).
86. Id. § 62A.2-715(2)(a).
87. Id. § 62A.2-715 official comment 4.
88. Id. § 62A.2-715(2)(a).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
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the bargain.9" Implied warranties are of two kinds:
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The war-
ranty of merchantability accompanies the goods unless it is
excluded or modified.91 To be merchantable, goods must,
among other things, be fit for the ordinary purposes for which
they are used.92 The warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose arises when the seller, at the time of contracting, has rea-
son to know of any particular purpose for which the goods are
required and of the buyer's reliance on the seller's judgment to
furnish suitable goods.93 This warranty also accompanies the
goods unless excluded or modified. Other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade unless
excluded or modified.
94
These warranties are closely related, in theory, to the
manufacturer's representation, which is implied by the strict
liability rule of tort law, that his product is reasonably safe for
its intended purpose.95 The promisor who breaches a warranty
is subject to strict liability similar to that of a manufacturer
under strict product liability in tort.96 The terms of the war-
ranty define the scope of the manufacturer's duty. Strict, ver-
sus conditional, contract duties are a form of insurance and are
used "in order to transmit information or to make information
credible so that it may be used by others."97
The fundamental distinction drawn by the Tort Reform
Act of 1981, and acknowledged by the Washington Supreme
Court in Stuart, that recovery for pure economic loss is limited
to contract remedies while recovery for economic loss associ-
ated with personal injury or property damage is allowed in
tort, appears to be a distinction without a difference. 98 Eco-
nomically, lost wages are analogous to lost profits. In a given
case, the presence or absence of personal injury or property
damage, in addition to economic loss, has no effect on the eco-
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-313(1)(a).
91. Id. § 62A.2-314(1).
92. Id. § 62A.2-314(2)(c).
93. Id. § 62A.2-315.
94. Id. § 62A.2-314(3).
95. Products liability is a "hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and
contract, unique in the law." Stuart, 109 Wash. 2d at 418, 745 P.2d at 1290 (quoting W.
PROSSER, TORTS 634 (4th ed. 1971)).
96. Bishop, supra note 12, at 244.
97. Id. at 245 (Information gaps need to be overcome with strict duties where the
manufacturer has an advantage over the buyer in knowledge.).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
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nomic rationale for allocating economic loss between the par-
ties. Consequently, the following analysis is equally applicable
to pure economic loss, regardless of whether personal injury or
property damage has also occurred..
When a buyer brings an action under a warranty theory,
the manufacturer will be held strictly liable for loss if a breach
is found.99 A manufacturer will maximize profits by taking a
cost-effective level of care and buying insurance for any other
loss, just as he would under strict liability in tort. The differ-
ence between strict liability in tort and strict liability under a
warranty theory, however, makes a warranty recovery for pure
economic loss more efficient than similar recovery in strict tort
liability in the vast majority of cases in which pure economic
losses are likely to occur. The warranty remedy is more effi-
cient because the adverse selection problem that plagues strict
liability is largely eliminated in the contract arena by the Had-
ley foreseeability doctrine.100 Moreover, the manufacturer
remains free to disclaim all warranty liability when the buyer
would be a cheaper insurer.
Recovery for consequential economic loss against a manu-
facturer would be barred if the buyer did not reveal the risk of
that loss to the manufacturer and pay him to assume it. No
longer would the manufacturer need to play guessing games
about widely varying potential liability. Under a contract rule,
then, the manufacturer would assume only those risks that he
could prevent more efficiently than the buyer. A buyer who
knew he was the cheapest insurer against the risk would not
bother to bargain with respect to the risk with the manufac-
turer, because he would not want the manufacturer to assume
the risk. The price would be too high.
Although the Hadley foreseeability rule and the privity
rule act to restrict the availability of contract recovery, they
promote efficiency in the commercial setting. A commercial
buyer, who is most aware of his potential losses, is likely to
bargain with the manufacturer or obtain express warranties
from the retailer regarding the risk of economic loss and
should be encouraged to seek efficient risk allocation. Hadley
forces the commercial buyer to make his risks known if he
wants the manufacturer to bear the risk. The manufacturer
can then act accordingly, either by disclaiming liability,
99. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
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purchasing market insurance, or exercising a higher level of
care.
A noncommercial buyer is not likely to have any pure eco-
nomic loss, and if he does, it is likely to be small. Someone
who buys a computer so his children can play video games or
to calculate home finances will likely suffer very little conse-
quential economic loss if the computer breaks down. His dam-
ages will likely be limited to cost of repair, which is ordinarily
covered by warranty. Thus, restricting recovery of pure eco-
nomic loss to the contract setting will not foreclose this type of
remedy. To the extent a buyer uses a product in income gener-
ating activity, such as one who buys a computer to aid him in a
stock trading "hobby" that creates substantial income, the
buyer can be expected to behave like a commercial buyer.
On the other hand, a small-business buyer who straddles
the line between a consumer and a large commercial buyer
may be foreclosed from recovery of pure economic loss if that
recovery is restricted to contract. For some small-business
buyers, transaction costs involved in dealing directly with the
manufacturer may prevent the buyer from bargaining effec-
tively with regard to his potential economic loss. Nevertheless,
the market may generate efficient terms for the small-business
buyer through the marginal buyer.
Under a warranty theory of recovery for pure economic
loss, the individual buyer will demand only a moderate use of
the product because any overly intensive use might increase
the risk of pure economic loss not contemplated by the manu-
facturer. Under such circumstances, recovery is denied under
the Hadley foreseeability rule. A buyer bearing that risk him-
self is not likely to use the product at maximum intensity.
If the buyer and manufacturer agree that the manufac-
turer will bear the risk of economic loss to the buyer, demand
and supply will shift as in the Figure 5 strict liability diagram.
The cost of the contract will increase, but so will the buyer's
utility because he will be able to use the product more inten-
sively. Some small commercial buyers may be less likely to
make pure economic loss part of the contract because of high
transaction costs. The marginal buyer, however, will likely
create the market pressures necessary to induce manufacturers
to offer warranties with efficient terms. Assuming perfect
knowledge, the small commercial buyer knows that the fore-
seeability rule and the privity rule will bar his recovery against
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the manufacturer. Accordingly, he will stay at Dmod, and the
supply curve will shift upwards. Therefore, when recovery is
limited to warranty, incentives exist for the small commercial
buyer to take cost-effective measures to prevent pure economic
loss. This result approximates the activity level under a negli-
gence and comparative fault rule.
If it is not possible to self-insure, and the market is resis-
tent to the pressures of the marginal buyer, such as in noncom-
petitive markets, the small commercial buyer should be
allowed a recovery for pure economic loss in negligence.
Where it is possible to self-insure, negligence liability is proba-
bly not the efficient solution because the manufacturer will
have great difficulty estimating PL in the Hand formula.
Additionally, if market insurance is more expensive than self-
insurance, consequential loss will be disclaimed. In fact, in
many consumer contracts, liability for consequential loss is
disclaimed.1"'
When comparing contract to tort remedies on the question
of which minimizes litigation and administrative costs, a con-
tract rule appears superior. Although a contract requires bar-
gaining costs up front, it saves costs later on as contingencies
considered in the contract occur. The parties can not only pre-
determine liability by allocating risk, but they can also pre-
determine damages by providing a liquidated damages clause.
Thus, when parties are able to bargain, a contract rule mini-
mizes litigation costs by eliminating the need for judicial deter-
minations of liability and damages. When parties are unable to
cost-effectively bargain over a term, however, a contract rule
performs no better than a tort rule in minimizing litigation
costs because the court will need to guess what the parties
would have bargained for on that term.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tort Reform Act of 1981, if not undermined by Stuart
v. Coldwell Banker, °2 aligns the law of Washington with the
majority of courts and commentators, who agree that pure eco-
nomic loss should be compensable only under contract law.
Overall, the Act is an improvement upon prior Washington law
and the minority view. Restricting recovery for pure economic
loss to contract remedies avoids the difficulty suffered by man-
101. See Priest, supra note 83, at 1345.
102. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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ufacturers in ascertaining the appropriate level of care in negli-
gence when the magnitude of the risk is difficult to estimate.
In addition, restricting recovery to the law of contracts avoids
the moral hazard and adverse selection problems created by
the strict liability rule. Finally, the Act creates positive incen-
tives for buyers and sellers to anticipate, estimate, and allocate
liability for commercial loss in a contractual setting.
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